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A Tort Only
in Violation of the Law of Nations
By JOSEPH MODESTE SWEENEY*
L INTRODUCTION
Like most people I know, I wish to adhere as much as possible to
the prevailing beliefs of the society in which I live, and as a member of
the legal profession, I find it as a general rule more comfortable to
abide by the beliefs it endorses rather than to depart from them. Of
course, I am free at any time to depart from them on grounds which
appear good and sufficient to me, but the transgression will, in most
cases, have the aura of sin; and sin, as everybody knows, calls for expi-
ation. I will admit that if I were still young and on the threshold of a
career, the prospect of penitence might deter me from assuming the
risk. Fortunately, the risk is no more than a minor consideration now
that I have reached what is called in France, with commendable civil-
ity, "le troisijme dge."'
A. The Question
It so happens I belong to a circle of law teachers who make it
their business to study the international legal system and keep abreast
of its currents. Within this somewhat esoteric and relatively small
community, a collective belief has taken hold of late concerning an
odd question: the role of the word "only" when it is bonded to the
* Licence en Droit, Grenoble University, 1945. LL.B. Harvard University, 1948.
Doctor Honoris Causa, Lyon University, 1969. Eberhard P. Deutsch Professor of Public
International Law Emeritus, Ilane University. Professor of Law, University of Califor-
nia, Hastings College of the Law (65 Club).
Michael Bollman was my student assistant when I started to think about this article at
Tulane University. He was an indefatigable researcher and a valued collaborator when I
began to perceive where the investigation was leading. I owe him many thanks for his
help.
I owe many thanks as well to Linda Weir, of the library at Hastings College of the
Law. She never tired of my innumerable requests to borrow esoteric books on the law of
nations of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and was always most diligent and gra-
cious in helping me use the resources of Hastings' own library.
1. The first age of man is youth. The second age of man is maturity. Then comes the
-third age of man.
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word "tort," as it is in the fourth clause of Section 9 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789.2 The clause granted jurisdiction to the federal district
courts over "a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States." The collective belief in the circle to which I belong
is that the bonding of the word "only" to the word "tort" had no effect
on the jurisdiction of the federal district courts, except perhaps to em-
phasize the exclusion of actions not in tort.3
The belief was planted by the federal Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in the celebrated case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala4 de-
cided in 1980. By then the clause was integrated into the United
States Code5 and the basic issue was whether the word "tort" in the
clause covered a wrong in violation of the international law of human
rights committed in Paraguay by a national of Paraguay against a na-
tional of Paraguay. The court ruled it did and hence federal jurisdic-
tion obtained. In interpreting the grant of jurisdiction to the federal
courts, the court did not consider whether the jurisdiction it based on
the word "tort" was affected by the word "only." The court obviously
believed the addition of the word "only" was irrelevant. The mem-
bers of the circle to which I belong quickly and uncritically subscribed
to the belief, at least so far as I can tell from their writings, for I have
not seen any which challenge it.
B. The Answer
The bonding of the word "only" to the word "tort" always struck
me as peculiar and intended to do more than merely exclude actions
not in tort. I never could see why granting jurisdiction over a "tort"
should be read as implying a grant of jurisdiction over something
other than a tort, thus creating a need to exclude the possibility. I
suspected that the draftsman had in mind a purpose which responded
to historical conditions no doubt familiar to the members of the Con-
gress of 1789, but not even remotely understood by us today. For this
reason, I engaged in a search of the law of nations and treaties of the
United States in effect before 1789 and for some years thereafter. By
the grace of a happy chance, I eventually came upon what I believe to
2. 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789) (later codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982)). For the lull text of
Section 9, see infra Appendix.
3. This is the position of Kenneth C. Randall in Federal Jurisdiction over International
Law Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. Ircr'L L. & POL. 1, 28 (1985).
4. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
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be the proper explanation for the bonding of the word "only" to the
word "tort."
Unfortunately, the explanation is not as simple as I wished it
were. It runs as follows:
1. When the United States was at war, its war vessels, public and
private, had the right under the branch of the law of nations known as
the law of prize, to capture on the high seas enemy merchant vessels
and enemy cargoes in order to have them condemned as lawful prize
in the courts of prize of the United States.
In the exercise of the right of capture, these war vessels had the
right of visiting and searching on the high seas all neutral merchant
vessels in order to verify the neutrality of vessel and cargo and of sub-
jecting them to capture if invested with an enemy character.
However, under treaties concluded with foreign nations before
1789, United States war vessels could visit, search, and capture on the
high seas the neutral merchant vessels of these nations only to the
extent permitted by the treaties.
2. In the exercise of the right of visitation and search under the
law of prize or under applicable treaties, commanders and crews of
the war vessels of the United States were forbidden to do injury to
person or property aboard the intercepted vessels.
An alien who was the victim of such an injury had the right to sue
the commander for reparation of the tort in the courts of prize created
by the several states during the War of the Revolution to exercise ju-
risdiction over all matters of capture.
In 1789, the federal courts, sitting as prize courts, were vested
with exclusive jurisdiction, as against the state courts, to decide the
legality of a capture as prize and any issue incidental to the capture,
such as a claim for reparation of a tort committed by the captors.
3. If the legality of the capture was not in issue and the case was
one in which an alien sued for a "tort only," the jurisdiction of the
federal courts was merely concurrent with the jurisdiction of the state
courts under the fourth clause in Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of
1789.
I shall now turn to proving my case, even if it may prove that the
word "tort" in the clause could not mean what the court in Filar'ga
said it meant, and hence could not provide a valid basis of jurisdiction
for its decision.
1995]
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H. THE "TORT ONLY" CLAUSE
A. The Original Text
The clause has a very presentable parentage. It was written in the
draft of the Act by Oliver Ellsworth,6 an able lawyer from Connecti-
cut.7 At the time he wrote, the Constitution had just gone into effect,
the new Congress had just convened, and he was the leader of the
Senate committee appointed to prepare a bill for organizing the judi-
cial system of the infant nation. Eventually, he was to become Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the country, but his claim to poster-
ity's fame stems principally from being the main draftsman of the bill.
As Madison put it: "It may be taken for certain, I believe, that the bill
organizing the Judicial Department originated in his draft and that it
was not materially changed in its passage into law."'8
In his handwritten draft for Section 9 of the Act, Ellsworth delim-
ited the cognizance, or jurisdiction as we would say today, of the fed-
eral district courts. In the third clause of his draft for the section (then
numbered 10), he wrote:
[The district courts] shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the
courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be,
of all causes where a foreigner sues for a tort only in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.9 (emphasis added).
The third clause in his draft became the fourth clause in Section 9 of
the Act. But the clause remained unchanged, with one exception: in
the Act, the term "an alien" was used instead of the term "a
foreigner."
6. "It ... appears ... that the original Draft Bill is in several different handwrit-
ings. ... Sections 10 [Section 9 of the Act] to 23 are, in all probability in the handwriting of
Oliver Ellsworth." Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act
of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REv. 49, 50 (1923-1924).
7. While there are several biographies of Ellsworth, the most complete and careful
one appears to be WI..iAM GARROTr BROWN, THE LIFE OF OLIVER ELLSWORTH (1905).
It is the one I rely on here.
8. Warren, supra note 6, at 60 n.27 (citing letter from James Madison to Joseph Ward
(Feb. 27, 1836)).
9. Bill to Establish the Judiciary (National Archives and Records Administration,
Center for Legislative Archives, Record Group 46, Records of the U.S. Senate (SEN 1A-
B1)).
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B. The Changes in the Text
In the course of time which followed, Congress undertook on
three occasions to make changes in the text of the clause, presumably
on the assumption they would improve it.
The first changes took place when the clause became Section 563
(Sixteenth) in the Revised Statutes of 1873.10 There, the text was
shorn of the reference to the concurrent jurisdiction of the courts of
the several states and the federal circuit courts. The phrase "all causes
where an alien sues" was made to read "all suits brought by any
alien," single quotation marks were placed around the word "only,"
and a comma was placed after the word "nations." It read as follows:
[The district courts shall have jurisdiction] of all suits brought by
any alien for a tort 'only' in violation of the law of nations, or a
treaty of the United States.
The next changes took place when the clause became Section 24
(Seventeenth) of the Act of March 3, 1911,11 which codified, revised,
and amended the laws relating to the judiciary. There the text of 1873
was modified by removing the single quotation marks around the
word "only," placing a comma after it, rendering the term "law of
nations" into the plural "laws of nations," and taking out the comma
after the word "nations." It read as follows:
[The district courts shall have jurisdiction] of all suits brought by
any alien for a tort only, in violation of the laws of nations or of a
treaty of the United States.
The last changes took place in 1948 when the clause became Sec-
tion 1350 of Title 28 of the United States Code. There, the text of
1911 was amended by returning the term "laws of nations" to the sin-
gular number, returning the term "any alien" to "an alien" as in the
text of the Act in 1789, inserting the word "committed" before the
words "in violation of," and substituting the words "any civil action"
for the term "all suits." Thus the clause now reads:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.'
10. REvisED STATUTES tit. 13, ch. 3, § 563, para. 16 (1873).
11. 36 Stat. 1087, 1093 (1911).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993).
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C. The Current Text
The changes in the text of the clause, whether useful or pointless,
did not affect the jurisdiction originally granted by the clause to the
federal district courts. In 1789, the clause gave those courts the right
to exercise their power over a limited class of causes-those where an
alien sued for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States. As can readily be seen by comparing the origi-
nal text of the clause with the text of Section 1350, the class of causes
was not narrowed, enlarged or otherwise modified by the changes in
the text since 1789. The class of causes over which the federal district
courts now have jurisdiction under Section 1350 thus remains pre-
cisely the class of causes over which those courts were given jurisdic-
tion by the clause in 1789.
Moreover, the concurrent jurisdiction of the courls of the several
states over the same class of causes was not affected by the changes in
the text of the clause. The courts of the several states did not receive
their jurisdiction from the clause; it belonged to them already as
courts of newly sovereign states. The clause merely acknowledged
that the jurisdiction of the federal district courts over this class of
causes would be concurrent with the existing jurisdiction of the courts
of the several states. The courts of the several states would have lost
their jurisdiction if the changes in the text of the clause had given the
federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over this class of causes.
But they did not.
D. The Causes in the Class
The question then is what were the causes over which the federal
district courts and the courts of the several states were to exercise
concurrent jurisdiction?
Had Ellsworth specified the wrongs for which a foreigner would
be able to sue in American courts, the causes over which the courts
were given jurisdiction would be precisely identified. They would be
the causes arising from the commission of those wrongs. But he did
not so specify. Succinct to a fault, as he often was,13 he presumed that
everyone in the new Congress would know what were the wrongs for
which a foreigner would be able to sue in American courts. Hence, he
deemed it sufficient to say the causes would be those where a for-
eigner sued for a "tort." Indeed, he went further and bonded to the
13. "Ellsworth ... possessed a peculiar style of condensed statement .... " BROWN,
supra note 7, at 41.
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word "tort" the word "only" without explanation of any sort, this time
on the presumption that everyone in the new Congress would know
why he did.
Thus we must find out what Ellsworth meant by the word "tort,"
and then we must find out why Ellsworth bonded to it the word
"only."
11. THE MEANING OF THE WORD "TORT"
The word "tort," as used by Ellsworth in the clause, referred to
wrongs under the law of prize.
In order to establish this proposition, I shall need first to provide
some general information about the law of prize. Its peculiar features,
especially its granting of private causes of action for the reparation of
the torts it prohibited, can be understood only in the context of the
system as a whole.
A. Historical Note
1. Maritime Capture
The capture of enemy merchant vessels as prize played an impor-
tant role in the War of the Revolution. According to one source, 530
British vessels were captured during the first year of the war. 4 Ac-
cording to another source, 733 British vessels were captured between
May 1776 and early 1778.15 In both accounts, the context indicates
that the vessels were merchant vessels. According to a publication of
the United States Naval Academy, 2,980 British vessels were captured
during the war,16 but the figure includes some vessels of war in addi-
tion to merchant vessels. A reasonable extrapolation suggests that the
total number of captured merchant vessels must have been at least
2,500.
The statistic is quite startling, especially when compared to the
2,452 Allied merchant vessels sunk by German submarines during the
Battle of the Atlantic in World War HI.17 The extraordinary feature of
the statistic, however, is that the captures were made mainly by pri-
14. J. THOMAS SCHARF, HISTORY OF TmE CONFEDERATE STATES NAVY 63 (1887).
15. FRANCIS R. STARK, TnE ABOLITION OF PRIVATEERINo AND THE DECLARATno.
oF PAPAs 123 (AMS Press 1967) (1897).
16. FACULTY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY, ANmRiCAN SEA PowER
SiNCE 1775, at 8 (Allan Westcott ed., 1947).
17. JoHN KEEGAN, THE SECoND WORLD WAR 121 (1990). The statistic covers the
sinkings from September 1939 to May 1943.
1995)
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vate vessels of war, or "privateers," rather than the United States pub-
lic vessels of war. Over the course of the war, there were probably
more than 2,000 American privateers in operation,18 while the number
of government war vessels diminished from thirty-one in 1776 to
seven in 1782.19
2. American Privateers
A historian of American privateers defines the term thus: "The
privateer, as understood at the outbreak of the war for American in-
dependence, was a ship armed and fitted out at private expense for
the purpose of preying on the enemy's commerce to the profit of her
owners, and bearing... a letter of marque, authorizing her to do so,
from the Government."20 He goes on to say, "The owners, of course,
had the lion's share [of the profits], though a considerable portion was
divided among the officers and crew as an... incentive to securing
prizes."21 While the Continental Congress had begun to build a navy
in the autumn of 1775,2 it opened the way to privateering on March
21, 1776 by resolving "[t]hat the inhabitants of these colonies be per-
mitted to fit out armed vessels to cruize on the enemies of these
United Colonies."3 Thereupon, privateering became part of the
American culture.
"Every seaport ...had its quota of privateers scouring the
seas ..... 24 "Merchants in every port joined in this grand adventure,
which filled their pockets in a patriotic cause."' 5 "They came forth
from New England in an endless stream .... [In 1776] New England,
in fact, had begun to live on privateering; in Salem it was the principal
business of the town. Even outside of New England, men like Wash-
ington and Morris engaged in it."'26 "The records of the Council of
Maryland show that [its privateers were so active] ... [the prizes they]
captured and sent into the Chesapeake realized over $1,000,000. [One
finds] ... in the list of owners of these vessels and their commanders
18. FACULTY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY, supra note 16, at 7.
19. EDGAR STANTON MACLAY, A HIsTORY OF AMERICAN PRIVATEERS 113 (Burt
Franklin ed., 1968) (1899).
20. l& at 7.
21. Id.
22. STARK, supra note 15, at 119.
23. 4 JouRNALs OF THm CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 230 (Library of Con-
gress, 1906).
24. MACLAY, supra note 19, at 69.
25. FACULTY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY, supra note 16, at 7.
26. STARK, supra note 15, at 123.
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some of the very best people in the State ....... 7 According to a
contemporary account of the exploits of Silas Talbot, the famous com-
mander of a privateer: "The country people came down from a con-
siderable distance, only to see Captain Talbot and his prizes and to
count the shot marks about the Argo."28
3. The Law of Nations
Before the Revolution, cases of capture as prize were decided,
subject to appeal, by the vice-admiralty courts established in all the
colonies2 9 and functioning in time of war as prize courts. The law ap-
plied to captures by the vice-admiralty courts was the English law of
prize, that is to say the law of nations governing the right of capture,
as understood and received in England and applied in the courts of
Great Britain. In Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle,3" decided in
1815, Chief Justice Marshall adopted as a rule of decision in the case a
rule of prize law that had been established in the British courts. He
explained why: "The United States having, at one time, formed a
component part of the British empire, their prize law was our prize
law. When we separated, it continued to be our prize law, so far as it
was adapted to our circumstances .... ,1 (emphasis in original).
B. The Law of Prize
1. Enemy Merchant Vessels
The condemnation of an enemy merchant vessel in a court of
prize would usually take place as a matter of course. It was identified
by the national flag it flew. The flag was conclusive of its enemy char-
acter 2 Hence this character, the legal basis for the capture, could not
be denied in the prize court. Moreover, the master and members of
the crew were deemed to possess the national character of their vessel
and hence to be enemy aliens.33 As such, they had no standing to
assert any right in a court of prize. 4 In short, there was no case for
litigation between captor and captured, and since there was no case to
27. ScHAR, supra note 14, at 64.
28. MACLAY, supra note 19, at 106.
29. J. FRANKL3N JAMESON, ESSAYS IN THE CONSTITuTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES IN THE FoRnA'IrIV PERIOD 1775-1789, at 5 (Books for Libraries Press 1970)
(1889).
30. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191 (1815).
31. Id at 198.
32. 3 ROBERT PLLIMOki, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW 606 (1857).
33. Id at 603-04.
34. Id. at 582. But they were not in general disabled to be a witness. Id. at 601-02.
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decide, there was no case to report in a reporter system, if there was
one.
2. Neutral Merchant Vessels
A different legal situation existed when belligerents interfered
with neutral merchant vessels by exercising the right of visitation and
search, and captured vessel and cargo on the ground that they were
invested with an enemy character. Whether the capture was justified
became a matter for litigation in the court of prize between captor and
captured and possibly a case for reporting, if a reporter system was in
effect.
The practical importance of this aspect of the right of capture is
evidenced by the disproportionate amount of space accorded to it by
text writers when dealing with maritime capture at large. Indeed,
statements by them which appear on their face to be made about the
right of capture in general will often be found on close examination to
apply only to the capture of neutral vessels or cargoes.
3. The Silesian Loan Report
During the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748), English pri-
vateers exercised the right of visitation and search to capture the car-
goes carried aboard eighteen Prussian merchant vessels and thirty-
three Prussian cargoes carried aboard merchant vessels of other pow-
ers. At the time of the captures, Prussia and these other powers were
neutrals as to Great Britain. In both cases the captors suspected the
cargoes really belonged to enemies of England. The English court of
prize restored the cargoes whenever bona fide Prussian ownership
could be established.
Frederic II (the Great) objected to the captures, asserting that the
goods of an enemy could not be taken aboard a neutral vessel. By
way of reprisal, he withheld the payment to English merchants of in-
terest on a loan secured by mortgages on properties in the Duchies of
Silesia. In the diplomatic correspondence which eventually followed
after the war, Frederic submitted in justification of his action a docu-
ment in French entitled Exposition des Motifs. George II requested
from his law officers a report on its validity. One of those composing
the report was Mr. Murray, solicitor-general, who later became Lord
Mansfield. It was submitted on January 18, 1753. 35 The report began
35. The full title of the report is as follows: Report of the Law Officers As to the
Action of Frederic HI in Withholding Payment of Interest on the Silesian Loan in Reprisal
[Vol. 18:445
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with a statement of the law of nations applicable to the dispute. I set
forth below the most significant parts of the statement.
a. The Right of Capture
"When two powers are at war, they have a right to make prizes of
ships, goods, and effects of each other upon the high seas."' '
"[W]hatever is the property of the enemy may be acquired by capture
at sea; but the property of a friend cannot be taken, provided he ob-
served his neutrality."'37
The "goods of an enemy on board the ship of a friend may be
taken," and "contraband goods going to the enemy, though the prop-
erty of a friend, may be taken as prize, because supplying the enemy
with what enables him better to carry on the war is a departure from
neutrality.138
"[B]y the law of nations, where two powers are at war, all ships
are liable to be stopped and examined to whom they belong, and
whether they are carrying contraband goods to the enemy."39 "[B]ut
particular treaties have enjoined a less degree of search, on the faith
of producing solemn passports, and formal evidence of property duly
attested."'4
b. The Judicial Proceeding
"By the maritime law of nations universally and immemorially
received, there is an established method of determination whether the
capture be, or be not, lawful prize."4
"Before the ship or goods can be disposed of by the captor, there
must be a regular judicial proceeding, wherein both parties may be
heard" and "condemnation thereupon as prize in a court of Admi-
ralty, judging by the law of nations and treaties.142 "The proper and
for Losses Alleged to Have Been Suffered by His Subjects at the Hands of English Pri-
vateers. Its text can be found at 2 DoctuNmas RELAk';r To LAw AND CusTOM OF Tm
SEA, AD. 1649-1767, at 348 (R.G. Marsden ed., 1916) [hereinafter Report]. The origin of
the loan is discussed at 371-72. The date of the report is at 374. The participation of Mr.
Murray is stated by the editor in note 1 at 348-49.
36. 2 DocuMENsT RmANG TO LAW AND CuSTOM OF THE SEA, A.D. 1649-1767,
supra note 35, at 350.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 354.
40. Id.
41. Id at 350.
42. Id.
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regular court for these condemnations is the court of that state to
whom the captor belongs."43
"If the sentence of the court of Admiralty is thought to be erro-
neous, there is in every maritime country a superior court of re-
view ..... 44 "This superior court judges by the same rule which
governs the court of Admiralty, viz. the law of nations, and the trea-
ties subsisting with that neutral power whose subject is a party before
[the court]."45
c. Condemnation or Restitution
"The evidence to acquit or condemn, with or without costs or
damages, must, in the first instance, come merely from the ship taken,
viz. the papers on board, and the examination on oath of the master
and principal officers; ..... I4 "If there do not appear from thence
ground to condemn as enemy's property, or contraband goods going
to the enemy, there must be an acquital; .... 1,47
"[In case of acquital and restitution] ... the law of nations allows,
according to the different degrees of misbehaviour or suspicion arising
from the fault of the ship taken and other circumstances of the case,
costs to be paid, or not to be received, by the claimant ....
However, "if a seizure is made without probable cause, the captor
is adjudged to pay costs and damages; for which purpose all privateers
are obliged to give security for their good behaviour; and this is re-
ferred to and expressly stipulated by many treaties. '4 9
d. The Source of Prize Law
According to the Exposition des Motifs, British ministers had ad-
mitted that the prize cases in issue had been decided by the "laws of
England." In context, the Exposition was charging that the British
courts had applied "the domestic or municipal laws of England"
rather than the law of nations.5 0
To this charge, the Report answered: "They must have been mis-
understood; for the law of England says, that all captures at sea, as
43. Id at 351.
44. Id at 352.
45. Id.
46. Id at 351.
47. Id
48. Id.
49. Id at 352.
50. Id. at 369.
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prize, in time of war, must be judged of in a court of Admiralty ac-
cording to the law of nations and particular treaties, where there are
any." "There never existed a case where a court, judging according to
the laws of England only, ever took cognizance of a prize."51 This
statement in the Report was to find strong confirmation in two deci-
sions of the King's Bench rendered when Lord Mansfield was on the
court.
L Le Caux v. Eden '
In Le Caux v. Eden, decided in 1781, the defendant was the com-
mander of a British privateer who, in October 1778, stopped a
merchant vessel from Jersey. After examining the papers and docu-
ments concerning her ownership and cargo, he seized her as prize and
caused the plaintiff and others to be removed from their vessel and
kept on board the privateer until her arrival in England. There John
Fiott, presumably the owner of the merchant vessel, claimed her with
all the merchandise laden at the time she was captured. The Court of
Admiralty restored the vessel and cargo to the claimant and con-
demned the captor in costs and damages. The plaintiff then brought
against the captor an action at common law for assault and false
imprisonment.
All the judges agreed that the plaintiff had no cause of action. In
his opinion, Justice Buller examined at some length the question
whether an action at common law could be maintained for imprison-
ment resulting from a capture as prize. He pointed out there was no
case "in which it has ever been holden, that such an action would
lie,"15 3 and then stated:
But the case does not rest on negative usage only; for there are
a current of authorities, from the time of Queen Elizabeth, to the
present time, all of which agree, that the Admiralty has jurisdiction,
not only of the question, 'prize or not prize,' but of all its conse-
quences: and many of them agree, that the Admiralty has the sole
and exclusive jurisdiction, and that the Courts of Common Law
have no jurisdiction at all of such questions."
To explain why this was so, Justice Buller quoted from an older case:
"The true reason why the jurisdiction is appropriated to the Admi-
ralty, is, that prizes are acquisitions jure belli, and jus belli is to be
51. Id.
52. 99 Eng. Rep. 375 (K.B. 1781).
53. Id. at 379.
54. Id.
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determined by the law of nations, and not the particular municipal law
of any country. '55
According to the reporter, "Lord Mansfield did not go into the
argument at large, but adhered to the opinion he had so repeatedly
and peremptorily given at Nisi Prius; and probably thought it more
decent to leave the discussion of it to the other judges. ' 5 6 In any case,
Lord Mansfield declared his assent to everything Justice Buller had
said. 7
ii. Lindo v. Rodney58
In Lindo v. Rodney, decided in 1782, Lord Mansfield delivered
the single opinion issued in the case, the other judges being in agree-
ment. Yet it is reported only as a long footnote to the opinion in Le
Caux v. Eden. The reporter decided to include it there, instead of
reporting it the following year, because of its connection with the sub-
ject of Le Caux and its thorough exposition of the "foundation and
nature of prize jurisdiction in the court of Admiralty."5 9
In the course of this exposition, Lord Mansfield said, "The end of
a Prize Court is, to suspend the property till condemnation; to punish
every sort of misbehaviour in the captors; to restore instantly,.., if,
upon the most summary examination, there don't appear a sufficient
ground; to condemn finally, if the goods really are prize ...." 60 He
then went on to say: "These views cannot be answered in any Court
of Westminster-Hall, and therefore, the Courts of Westminster-Hall
never have attempted to take cognizance of the question, 'prize or not
prize; .... 61
C. Courts of Prize
1. Before 1789
Until the Constitution went into effect in 1789, prize jurisdiction
was exercised by the courts of the several states pursuant to the rec-
ommendation of the Continental Congress in its Resolution of No-
vember 25, 1775. The Resolution provided: "That it be, and is hereby
recommended to the several Legislatures in the United Colonies, as
55. Id. at 382.
56. Id at 378.
57. Id at 385.
58. 99 Eng. Rep. 385 (K.B. 1782).
59. Id. at 385 n.1.
60. Id. at 386.
61. Id
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soon as possible, to erect courts of justice, or give jurisdiction to the
courts now in being, for the purpose of determining concerning the
captures to be made .... ." Whereupon the colonies, except Massa-
chusetts whose action had preceded that of Congress, created admi-
ralty courts and gave them, or existing courts, jurisdiction over
captures.63
a. Hopkinson's Reports
During the colonial period, "the demand for decisional literature
was met chiefly by importing reports from English courts."6' Hence,
prior to independence very few local decisions were reported and
published.65 The practice carried over into the early years of indepen-
dence. As a result, no reports were published of the decisions made in
matters of prize by the courts of admiralty of the several states during
the War of the Revolution, except for those of Hopkinson.
Francis Hopkinson, the admiralty judge of the State of Penn-
sylvania, published in 1789 a volume of six of his judgments. Some
claim it was the first volume of reports to be published in America,
but whether it was so is a subject of academic debate.6 In 1792, he
published a three volume collection of Miscellaneous Essays and Oc-
casional Writings; the third volume consisted of forty-nine of his judg-
ments and was entitled Judgments in Admiralty Court of Pennsylvania,
1779-1788.67 Thirty of them involved matters of prize.
b. Cases on Appeal
The Resolution of November 25, 1775 provided: "That in all
cases an appeal shall be allowed to the Congress, or such person, or
persons as they shall appoint for the trial of appeals, .. .. "68 At first,
the appeals were referred to special committees whose members were
styled "Commissioners. ' 69 Later, the appeals were referred to a
Standing Committee.7" Finally, they were referred to a permanent
62. 3 JOURNALS OF THE CONTNENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, supra note 23, at 373-74.
63. HAMYTON L. CARSON, THE SupitmRm COURT OF THE UNnnD STATES: ITs Hs.
TORY 44 (2d ed. 1892).
64. ERWIN C. SURRENCY, A HISTORY OF AmnccN LAW PUBusHmG 37 (1990).
65. Id. at 39.
66. Id. at 40.
67. 1(A-L) CATALOGUE OF THE LmRARY OF THE LAW SCHOOL OF HARVARD UNm.
vEsrrY 951 (1967).
68. 3 JOURNALS OF THE CONmm-nrAL CONGRSS 1774-1789, supra note 23, at 374.
69. CARSON, supra note 63, at 50.
70. Id. at 51.
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body created on January 15, 1780 and entitled "The Court of Appeals
in Cases of Capture."'71
The special committees, the Standing Committee, and the Court
of Appeals together decided 118 cases.71 "So far as appears [from the
records] ... no written reports in the nature of opinions were made by
the committees."73 "The Court of Appeals filed only eight opinions,
all of which are reported in 2 Dallas 1-42 ..... 74 Dallas reported
them under the heading "Federal Court of Appeals."
2. After 1789
By Article III of the Constitution, the admiralty jurisdiction of
the state courts was delegated to the federal courts.7" Accordingly,
the second clause in Section 9 of the Judiciary Act provided that the
federal district courts would have exclusive original jurisdiction over
all civil causes of admiralty.76 The question then came up whether the
delegation to the federal courts of the admiralty jurisdiction of the
state courts included prize jurisdiction.
a. Prize Jurisdiction
The argument against federal prize jurisdiction was advanced in
Jennings v. Carson 7 7 decided by the federal district court for Penn-
sylvania in 1792. The case arose from the capture by an American
privateer in 1778 of the merchant vessel of a national of Holland. The
argument ran as follows. The court of admiralty in England was di-
vided into two sides: the "instance side" and the "prize side." The
instance side had jurisdiction over the ordinary subjects of admiralty,
while the prize side had jurisdiction over captures in time of war. The
same division existed in the colonial courts of admiralty. The state
courts of admiralty which had been created to replace the colonial
courts of admiralty had inherited the division. Hence, when the admi-
ralty jurisdiction of the state courts was delegated to the federal
courts, the district courts received only the jurisdiction on the instance
side, not the jurisdiction on the prize side.
71. JAmEsoN, supra note 29, at 27-30.
72. CARSON, supra note 63, at 61.
73. J.C. Bancroft Davis, Federal Courts Prior to the Adoption of the Constitution, 131
U.S.(app.) xix, xxxiv (1889).
74. Id. at xxxv.
75. "Section 2. The judicial Power of the United States shall extend ... to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction ... ." U.S. CoNs-r. art. III, § 2.
76. 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789).
77. 13 F. Cas. 540 (D. Pa. 1792) (No. 7,281).
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The judge who decided the case had been register of the colonial
court of admiralty of Pennsylvania before the Revolution. 78 He re-
jected the argument, stating the division did not exist in the admiralty
courts of the colonies and hence "if the powers of an admiralty...
court are delegatdd by congress to this court, those of a prize court are
mixed in the mass of authority with which it is invested .... "9 The
Supreme Court closed the issue in 1794 by declaring in Glass v. The
Sloop Betsey8" that "every District Court in the United States, pos-
sesses all the powers of a court of Admiralty, whether considered as
an instance, or as a prize court."81
3. The War of 1812
The capture of British vessels by American privateers played an
important role in the War of 1812, just as it did in the War of the
Revolution. The navy of the United States consisted of twenty-two
vessels, twelve of which were lost during the hostilities 2 But there
were 515 privateers in operation according to one sourcep 516 ac-
cording to another, and 526 according to a third. s Their prizes num-
bered at least 1,341.1 A brochure handed to tourists on the
waterfront of Baltimore claims that 126 privateers from the city ac-
counted for 556 of the British vessels captured or destroyed in the
war. 7 The name of Jean Laffite is well remembered in New Orleans,
but it is for his participation in the battle for the city rather than for
his deeds, or misdeeds, as the leader of a fleet of privateers operating
under letters of marque issued by the Republic of Cartagena.P
78. Id at 541 n.3.
79. Id. at 542.
80. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6 (1794).
81. Id. at 16. The case should be read with caution. As the Supreme Court made clear
in the case of L'Invincible, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 238 (1816), the ruling that the federal district
court had prize jurisdiction did not mean that it should exercise that jurisdiction. In the
Glass case, the capture of the prize was made by a French captor. The right to exercisejurisdiction to condemn as prize belonged exclusively to the prize courts of the captor's
nation, not to the federal district court.
82. 2 A.T. MAHAN, SEA POWER IN ITs REATroNs TO THE WAR OF 1812, at 242,244
(1919).
83. STrARc, supra note 15, at 135.
84. MAHAN, supra note 82, at 242.
85. MACtAY, supra note 19, at 506.
86. See STARK, supra note 15, at 135 (setting the number at 1,341); MACI.AY, supra
note 19, at 506 (setting it at 1,345); MAHAN, supra note 82, at 242 (setting it at 1,344).
87. Ed Kane's 1993 Water Taxi: A Waterfront Guide to Baltimore (1993).
88. The Republic of Cartagena is now part of Colombia. According to the journal of
Jean Laffite, he had on hand at the time of his troubles with Governor Claiborne (1813-14)
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a. Privateering Abolished
The War of 1812 was the last war of the United States in which
privateering played a role. It was abolished by the Declaration of
Paris of April 16, 1856: "La course est et demeure abolie."89 ("Priva-
teering is and remains abolished.") The Declaration received the ad-
herence of the principal states of the world, but not of the United
States. Nevertheless, the United States virtually abandoned the prac-
tice thereafter.9°
b. Supreme Court Decisions
The War of 1812 resulted in extensive prize litigation in the fed-
eral courts. As the superior court of review, the Supreme Court made
remarkable contributions to the international law of prize. Colombos,
a well known English scholar, noted the fact, stating: "[T]he influence
of the Supreme Court... has been very important, and the judgments
delivered by two of its most distinguished members, Mr. Justice Story
and Chief Justice Marshall, rank amongst the greatest pronounce-
ments on the law of prize."91
D. Writings on Prize
1. The Letter to John Jay
Great Britain declared war on France in February of 1793. In
the course of the war, controversies arose with the United States in-
volving, among other things, the exercise by Great Britain of its right
of visiting and searching American merchant vessels on the high seas.
In April of 1794, John Jay, then Chief Justice of the United States,
went to London on a mission to settle the conflicting claims of the
parties. They agreed to submit their claims to arbitration in the treaty
of November 19, 1794, commonly known as the Jay treaty.93
some thirty-two vessels. JEAN LAFeT=, THE JOURNAL OF JEAN IArrE 53 (1958).
Whether they were all vessels of war, or if some were prizes, is not clear.
89. Declaration Respecting Maritime Law Between Austria, France, Great Britain,
Prussia, Sardinia, and Turkey, Apr. 16, 1856, 115 [1856] Consolidated T.S. 1, 2 (Clive Parry
ed., 1969).
90. MAcLAY, supra note 19, at xxiii.
91. C. JOHN COLOMnos, Tim INTERNATIONAL LAW OF Tm SEA 813 (6th ed. 1967).
92. BRUCE WErERAu, THE NEW YoRK PuBLIc LIBRARY BOOK OF CHRONOLOGIES
456 (1990).
93. The mission, the treaty, and the arbitration are reported at great length in 4 INrrER.
NATIONAL ADJUDICATIONS 3 (John Bassett Moore ed., 1931). Information on the mission
of John Jay begins at 24.
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In the discharge of his mission, John Jay retained as counsel for
the United States Dr. John Nicholl and Sir William Scott (later Lord
Stowell), who became famous as judge of the High Court of Admi-
ralty.94 They prepared at Jay's request a statement of the law in prize
causes and delivered it by letter dated September 10, 1794. After the
introductory paragraph, it read: "The general principles of proceeding
[in prize causes] cannot, in our judgment, be stated more correctly or
succinctly, than we find them laid down in the following extract from a
report made to His late Majesty, in the year 1753 ..... ,, 9
The report to which the statement referred was, of course, the
Silesian Loan Report, and the extract included in the statement was
the exposition of the law of prize contained in that report. The letter
given John Jay was then reproduced in scholarly writings of the nine-
teenth century on the law of prize, such as those of Wheaton, Story,
Phillimore, and Upton.96 In this manner, the exposition of the law of
prize, born in 1753 from a political dispute, eventually became part of
the learned literature on the subject.
2. The Notes of Wheaton
Henry Wheaton was the reporter for the cases decided by the
Supreme Court from 1816 through 1827. Thereafter he had a long
and successful career in the diplomatic service. In that career, he ac-
quired fame for his writings on international law, some of which he
originally wrote and published in French.97
Before becoming the reporter for Supreme Court decisions, he
published (besides his translation of the French Civil Code of 1804) a
three hundred page treatise on the law of prize entitled A Digest of the
Law of Maritime Captures and Prizes.98 While reporter for Supreme
Court decisions, he wrote extensively on diverse legal topics and pub-
lished these writings in appendices to eight of the twelve volumes of
94. Id. at 30, 31.
95. Id at 43-48.
96. Henry Wheaton published the letter to Jay as an appendix to his DiGEsr OF THE
LAw OF MARrmnE CAiruRES AND PRZs (1815). Thomas Pratt used it as an introduction
to NOTES ON THE PRINCIPLEs AND PRACtiCE OF PRIZE CouRTS BY THE LATE JuDoE
STORY (1854). Robert Phillimore reproduced it in 3 COMMENARImS uPoN INTERNA.
TiONAL LAw 551 (1857). Francis J. Upton put it as an appendix to THE LAW OF NATIONS
AFFEcriNG ComMERcE DURING WAR, WITH A REVIEW OF THE JURISDICTION, PRACTICE
AND PROCEEDINGS OF PRIZE CouRTs (1863).
97. 10 DICIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 39-42 (Dumas Malone ed., 1936).
98. It was published in 1815.
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his reports. 9 His industry in so doing led Daniel Webster to say, "No
reporter in modem times has inserted so much and so valuable matter
of his own."'1 Note II in the Appendix to the first volume of his
reports was "On the Practice in Prize Causes."1 ' Note I in the Ap-
pendix to the second volume of his reports contained "Additional
Notes on the Principles and Practice in Prize Causes.""~ Together,
they formed a ninety-two page treatise on the subject.
3. Judge Story's Claim
In 1854, Frederic Thomas Pratt published in London a volume
entitled Notes on the Principles and Practice of Prize Courts by the
Late Judge Story. The publication contained first the Letter to John
Jay and then the "Notes on the Practice of Prize Courts" published by
Wheaton in the appendices to the first and the second volumes of his
Supreme Court reports.10 3
Pratt asserted that Wheaton's Notes had been written by Justice
Story. He put in as evidence a document published in The Life and
Letters of Joseph Story by His Son, William W. Story.' 4 The docu-
ment, described by the son as an "entry in one of the memorandum-
books of my father," read in part:
June 12th, 1819. It is not my desire to be known as the author of
any of the notes in Mr. Wheaton's Reports. Lest, however, the fact
should transpire, and it should be supposed that he is tader obliga-
tions to me for notes which are his own, I think it best to put down
those notes which I have written. I made it an express condition,
that the notes furnished by me should pass as his own, and I know
full well, that there is nothing in any of them which he could not
have prepared with a very little exertion of his own diligence and
learning. 0 5
The document went on to list the Notes involved and included those
published by Wheaton on prize causes in the appendices to the first
and the second volumes of his reports. The son wrote that the deaths
of his father and Wheaton had "removed any personal reason for the
99. Volumes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 10.
100. 10 DICIONARY OF AMimucAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 97, at 40.
101. Henry Wheaton, On the Practice in Prize Causes, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)(app.) 494
(1816).
102. Henry Wheaton, Additional Notes on the Principles and Practice in Prize Causes,
15 U.S. (2 Wheat.)(app.) 1 (1817).
103. Pratt, supra note 96, at vii.
104. Id. at 12.
105. 1 Lim Am LErRs OF JosEPH STORY 283 (William W. Story ed., 1851).
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concealment of the authorship of these notes."'1 6 He explained that
he was making the document public because it showed "the lavish
generosity with which . . . [his father] imparted all that he
2)107knew, ....
E. Reparation for Wrongful Capture
In cases of wrongful capture, the prize court would order restitu-
tion of the merchant vessel and allow the captured to claim damages
against the commander of the private or public vessel of war. The
damages could be substantial. In Le Caux v. Eden, the judge of the
admiralty ordered the register of the court to make a report on the
amount of costs and damages to be paid by the captor. The report
included allowances for the following: the passage of passengers; the
sailors' wages from the time of capture to their arrival in Jersey; their
expenses in the intermediate time; the master's expenses; sundry
ship's materials that were missing; repairs to the ship; loss of part of
the cargo, damage to the rest, and diminution in the value of the pro-
duce by the loss of market; demurrage; interest on two bills of ex-
change; insurance on the ship, and the remaining part of the cargo,
from England to Jersey; commission on the valuation of the ship and
cargo; and expenses for the assistance of two merchants in making the
report.1
0 8
1. Private Vessels of War
The law of prize required the commander of a privateer to give
security for the payment of the damages he might be ordered to pay
for a wrongful capture. The Continental Congress was aware of the
rule.. It authorized privateering on March 23, 1776.109 On April 3,
1776, it approved the form of a letter of marque and reprisal for pri-
vate armed vessels. The form required the commander of a private
war vessel to deliver a penalty bond, with sureties, before he could
receive the letter of marque and reprisal. The bond guaranteed repa-
ration, within the stated amount, of damages sustained as a result of
the misconduct of the commander or the crew." 0
106. I&
107. Id- at 284.
108. Le Caux v. Eden, 99 Eng. Rep. 375, 376 (K.B. 1781).
109. 4 JouRNALs OF =HE Com ?frAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, supra note 23, at 230.
110. Henry Wheaton, On the Subject of Prize Law, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.)(app.) 52,107-08
(1820).
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The owners of a privateer were jointly liable with their com-
mander for the damages. Judge Hopkinson so ruled in the case of
Gibbs v. The Two Friends.l11 His ruling was upheld on appeal.11 The
owners, however, were liable to the extent of the actua loss and injury
even if the damages exceeded the amount of the bond given by their
commander.113
2. Public Vessels of War
In the case of the Acteon," 4 an American merchant vessel was
sailing under an English license to take a cargo to Spain, where Great
Britain was at war with France. On its return to the United States, it
was stopped on the high seas by a public vessel of war of Great Brit-
ain. The captain of the British war vessel, suspicious of the license
and for other reasons, destroyed the American vessel by setting it
afire. In the court of prize, the captain did not object to paying resti-
tution for the destroyed vessel. However, he argued that damages
should not be awarded unless he was found guilty of wilful miscon-
duct. Sir W. Scott held the captain liable for the payment of damages,
even though the captain had not acted from any corrupt or malicious
motive. Sir W. Scott indicated he had no doubt the captain would be
indemnified by the government.
On the other hand, the commanders and crews of public vessels
of war shared in the profits of their captures. In its ordinance of Janu-
ary 6, 1776, the Continental Congress regulated in great detail the
shares of prizes to be allocated to commanders, captains, lieutenants,
petty officers, gunners, surgeons and others, including cooks, who
formed the company of government war vessels.115
F. Reparation for Personal Wrongs
Under the law of prize, neutral merchant vessels were forbidden
to offer resistance to visitation and search by the war vessels of bel-
ligerents. They became lawful prize of war if they did." 6 If, on the
basis of visitation and search, the commander decided the neutral
merchant vessel or its cargo had an enemy character, capture fol-
111. FRANcis HoPyiNSON, JUDGMENTS IN ADMIRALTY COURT IN PENNSYLVANIA 1779-
1788, at 95 (1781).
112. Id. at 98.
113. Wheaton, supra note 102, at 14.
114. The Acteon, 2 Dods. 48, 165 Eng. Rep. 1411 (Adm. 1815).
115. Wheaton, supra note 110, at 105-06.
116. The Maria, 1 C. Rob. 340, 364, 165 Eng. Rep. 199, 207 (Adm. 1799).
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lowed. The commander would put aboard the captured vessel a quali-
fied prize-master and a sufficient crew to navigate her to a convenient
port.1 7 The persons aboard the captured vessel, although not prison-
ers of war, became captives on either their own vessel or the vessel of
the captors, until they were released in the port of adjudication.",,
Thus the captives and their captured vessel were under the com-
plete control of the capturing commander and his crew from the mo-
ment they were ordered to stop for visitation and search to the
moment they reached port. If, during this period, they suffered injury
from the commander, his crew, or his prize-master, they were entitled
to sue the commander for reparation of the injury. If, during this pe-
riod, property on the vessel or the vessel itself was damaged, taken, or
destroyed as a result of the conduct of the commander, his crew, or his
prize-master, the owners of the property were entitled to sue the com-
mander for reparation of the loss. The owners of a privateer were
jointly liable with their commander for reparation of the injury or loss.
I set forth below cases on point and other relevant material.
1. English Cases
a. The St. Juan Baptista and La Purissima Conception 1 9
Two Spanish merchant vessels were charged by an English priva-
teer with resistance to visitation and search. They had sailed in igno-
rance of the war in which Great Britain had become involved with
another nation. Hence, they did not know the privateer was a bellig-
erent vessel of war entitled to exercise the right of visitation and
search. The prize court decreed restitution of the vessels and allowed
damages for two months detention.
The captured claimed improper conduct by the captors, alleging
"the Spanish crew, to the number of twenty-two persons, were put in
irons."' 0 The court said the misconduct appeared to have proceeded
from an improper notion of security, rather than from an intention to
inflict pain or personal indignity. Accordingly, it gave the claimants
compensation in the amount of one hundred pounds.
The captured also claimed embezzlement of some articles."' The
court ordered a report on the value of the articles. When it became
117. Upton, supra note 96, at 394.
118. Id. at 439, 441-42.
119. 5 C. Rob. 33, 165 Eng. Rep. 687 (Adm. 1803).
120. 5 C. Rob. at 40, 165 Eng. Rep. at 689.
121. This sequel appears as a footnote on the first page of the report of The Die Fire
Darner, 5 C. Rob. 357, 165 Eng. Rep. 804 (Adm. 1805).
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available, Great Britain and Spain had come to war. Thus the Spanish
owners had become enemies of Great Britain and as such had no
longer a "persona standi" to claim in a British court compensation for
the embezzlement. But the court said the money would be made
available to the government, and the government could then give the
Spanish owners a license to take the money out of the country.
b. The Die Fire Damer' 22
The commander of a British privateer put aboard a neutral vessel
a prize-master who, according to the master of the neutral vessel, was
guilty of great cruelty and misbehaviour to the captured crew. The
captured crew prayed for a decree of pecuniary compensation against
the owners of the privateer.
Sir W. Scott stated: "Owners are.., answerable for the proper
conduct of the persons to whose care they entrust the conduct of their
privateer. They ought not to put their vessel into the hands of a per-
son capable of being guilty of such outrageous behaviour, as is im-
puted to the prize master in this instance .... " 123 He went on to
remark that he dealt "very scanty justice, by condemning them in the
sum of one hundred guineas, to be divided amongst the crew of the
neutral vessel."' 24 He also added, "It is stated, that the privateer
which made this capture has since been lost. If that had not been the
case, I should certainly have directed measures to be taken for the
forfeiture of her letter of marque."" s
2. Hopkinson's Reports
a. Silas Talbot v. The Owners of the Brigs Achilles, Patty, and
Hibernia 126
Being on a cruise on the sloop Argo in September 1779, Silas Tal-
bot discovered and captured after a two hour engagement the brig
Betsey, a British letter of marque. Talbot put aboard a prize-master
and eleven of his crew, with written orders to take her to New London
for condemnation. Soon after, the brigs Achilles, Patty, and Hibernia,
which were American privateers, came up under British colors (a
common and proper ruse of war at the time). Taking them for ene-
122. I.
123. 5 C. Rob. at 359-60, 165 Eng. Rep. at 804-05.
124. 5 C. Rob. at 360, 165 Eng. Rep. at 805.
125. Id
126. HopmiNsON, supra note 111, at 132.
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mies, Talbot left his prize. The brigs then boarded and made prize of
the Betsey, took out the prize-master and the other men from the
Argo, put their own people on board, and ordered her for Philadel-
phia. But on her way she was captured by a British cruiser, carried
into New York, and thus lost to all parties. The three brigs went on
their voyages, taking the Argo's men with them. They left the men in
Spain and other remote regions.
Talbot filed a libel against the owners of the three brigs. After
hearing the testimony, Judge Hopkinson stated that the act of the
three brigs was one "of such unjustifiable violence and wrong... [he
was] clear in deciding in favour of the ibellant."12 7 He ascertained
the value of the Betsey and gave judgment in that amount against the
owners of the three brigs. An appeal by the owners to the Court of
Appeals in Cases of Capture was rejected.' s
3. Treaty Provisions
On June 12,1776, the Continental Congress appointed a commit-
tee to prepare a model for treaties to be proposed to foreign pow-
ers.129 A model treaty, to be proposed to France, was adopted by the
Congress on September 17, 1776.11
In cases where one of the parties became a belligerent and the
other was neutral, the model treaty greatly lessened, as between the
parties, the need for the right of visitation and search. It did this by
adopting, in Article 26,11 the principle that free ships would make
free goods. In other words, enemy goods aboard neutral merchant
vessels would not be subject to capture. As a result, visitation and
search became pointless so far as concerned neutral vessels sailing
from enemy ports. However, it remained useful to discover contra-
band of war aboard neutral vessels sailing to enemy ports. Articles 15
and 16 of the model treaty regulated the manner in which the right of
visitation and search would be exercised against neutral merchant yes-
127. Id. at 137.
128. The information is provided in a note at the end of the report. The note does not
say on what ground the appeal was made, but it must have been on the ground that the
Admiralty Court of Judge Hopkinson lacked jurisdiction over the case. Then the Court of
Appeals held that it itself lacked jurisdiction over the case because the suit was between
citizens for damages only. Whether it was lacking jurisdiction, or not, is discussed infra in
Section IV.C.
129. 5 JouRNAts OF Trm ConNNAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, supra note 23, at 433.
130. Id. at 768.
131. Id. at 775.
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sels sailing to an enemy port.132 Article 18 of the model treaty dealt
with the wrongs which the commanders and crews of vessels of war
might commit while exercising the right of visitation and search
against such neutral vessels. 33
The terminology of the article is archaic because its text is drawn
from Article 28 of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation concluded
between France and Great Britain at Utrecht on April 11, 1713 in
French and Latin.134 I have compared the English text of Article 18 to
the French text of Article 28, and there can be no doubt about the
source.
The Article first states its purpose: "[T]hat more effectual Care
may be taken, for the Security of the Subjects, and Inhabitants of both
parties, that they suffer no Injury by the Men of War or Privateers of
the other Party." The Article next states a prohibition: "[A]ll the
Commanders of the Ships of the most Christian King, and of the said
United States and all their Subjects and Inhabitants shall be forbid,
doing any Injury, or Damage to the other Side." The Article then
states the consequences for the violation of the prohibition: "[I]f they
act to the contrary, they shall be punished, and shall moreover be
bound to make Satisfaction for all matter of Damage, and the Interest
thereof, by Reparation, under the Penalty and Obligation of their Per-
sons and Goods."
Article 18 of the model treaty became Article 17 in the Treaty of
Amity and Commerce concluded with France on February 6, 1778.135
With slight modifications, it became Article 13 in the Treaty of Amity
and Commerce concluded with the Netherlands on October 8, 1782,136
and Article 15 in the Treaty of Amity and Commerce concluded with
Sweden on April 3, 1783.'37 In shorter and less archaic language, it
was incorporated into Article 15 of the Treaty of Amity and Com-
merce concluded with Prussia on September 10, 1785: "[A]I1 persons
belonging to any Vessel of war public or private who shall molest or
injure in any manner whatsoever the people, Vessels or effects of the
other party shall be responsible in their persons & property for dam-
ages & interest .... 138
132. Id. at 771-72.
133. Id. at 773.
134. 28 [1713-1714] Consolidated T.S. 1 (Clive Parry ed., 1969).
135. 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL Acrs OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 3, 15-16 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931).
136. Id at 59, 71-72.
137. Id. at 123, 135-36.
138. I& at 162, 173.
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4. Federal Cases
a. The Lively 39
An American privateer captured the schooner Lively, an Ameri-
can merchant vessel, as prize. The commander of the privateer had
received information that the vessel intended to trade with the enemy
and thought her conduct indicated such an intention. Trading with the
enemy invested a merchant vessel with an enemy character. It was an
offense against the law of prize long before the American Revolution.
It subjected vessel and cargo to condemnation as prize of war.140
The owners of the vessel and cargo filed a libel for restitution.
The district court ordered vessel and cargo restored to the owners and
appointed commissioners to assess the damages. To the damages
awarded the owners, the court then added a sum of one hundred dol-
lars for the personal indignities and abuse inflicted upon the owner of
the vessel, who was aboard at the time of capture.
Circuit Justice Story said there could be no doubt of the jurisdic-
tion of the court "to punish every indignity offered to those who, by
the fortunes of war, fall into the possession" of American vessels of
war.' 4 He stated the court would not tolerate "personal indignities,
or unnecessary modes of restraint" towards neutrals or citizens of the
country.'42 He further stated the court would never hesitate to give
exemplary damages for undeserved suffering or malicious injury.
Nevertheless, the court denied the award for indignities and abuse in
this case because the behavior of the owner of the Lively had been
improper and provocative.
b. Dias v. The Revenge and Bustamento v. Same 43
The American privateer the Revenge chased, under British colors,
the Portuguese brig Triomphe de Mars and brought her to. An officer
from the privateer boarded the brig, put a pistol to the breast of the
master and declared him a prisoner. Thereupon the officer ordered
the trunks to be opened, took all the money he could find, and carried
it with some other property back to the privateer. The brig was al-
lowed to proceed and arrived safely in New York.
139. 15 F. Cas. 631 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 8,403).
140. The 'Tulip, 24 F. Cas. 307, 314 (C.C.D. Pa. 1813) (No. 14,234).
141. The Lively, 15 F. Cas. at 636.
142. Id
143. 7 F. Cas. 637 (C.C.D. Pa. 1814) (No. 3,877).
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The same privateer, again under British colors, chased the Iris, a
Spanish merchant vessel, and fired broadsides into her as she lay to-
a violation of the law of prize (chasing under false colors was lawful,
but not firing). The master and crew of the Iris were manacled. Eight
hundred dollars in silver, eight boxes containing three thousand silver
dollars, and other articles, were taken to the privateer. The Iris was
allowed to continue on her voyage, but was later reboarded by the
Revenge and ordered to Cadiz.
The commander and crew of the Revenge were indicted for pirati-
cal acts, but were acquitted by the jury. The owners of the Portuguese
and the Spanish vessels filed libels against the owners of the privateer
for reparation of the acts of piracy they -had suffered. The district
court dismissed the libels.
Circuit Justice Washington said the owner of a privateer was lia-
ble for the wrongful conduct of its commander so long as the com-
mander was executing the business for which he was employed. He
stated that on this principle, an owner "is liable for... embezzlement
of the property taken as prize by the officers and crew; and for ill-
treatment unnecessarily inflicted upon the persons of the prize-
crew.'))44 But, if the commander "turns his back upon the business
intrusted to him, and sanctioned by his commission, and commits acts
of piracy,... [such acts] cannot, upon any principle.., be visited upon
his owners. '145 Accordingly, the court affirmed the decree of the dis-
trict court.
c. The Amiable Nancy ' 6
The Amiable Nancy was a neutral schooner from Haiti. She was
boarded by an American privateer. The crew of the privateer plun-
dered the property aboard the schooner, and beat and otherwise ill-
treated her master and crew. Those participating in the offenses were
eventually tried and convicted by a naval court martial.
The master of the schooner, the supercargo, the mate, and one
mariner, filed a libel against the owners of the privateer for the plun-
dered property and the personal injuries. In argument, the owners in
effect conceded that the libellants were entitled to "an indemnity for
144. Id. at 640.
145. Id. at 641.
146. 1 F. Cas. 765 (C.C.D. N.Y. 1817) (No. 331), modified 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546
(1818).
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the property taken, and to a reasonable remuneration for personal
injuries."'147
The district court directed its clerk to assess, with the help of two
merchants, the amounts to be paid for the plundered property. When
the assessment was made, the court decreed payment in the amounts
assessed. The court further decreed that there be paid for personal
injuries five hundred dollars to the supercargo, one hundred to the
master, one hundred to the mate, and fifty to the mariner.
Neither the amounts awarded for the plundered property, nor
those awarded for personal injuries, were in issue when the case went
on appeal to the circuit court, and later the Supreme Court. The ap-
peals involved the compensation awarded the owner of the schooner
and cargo. He had joined in the libel for the damages he had suffered
as a consequence of the illegal boarding. The privateer had taken her
papers. Because she did not have any papers, she had been captured
by a British vessel of war and condemned in a British court of prize.
The cargo had then been sold at a loss in order to redeem the
schooner after her condemnation and to pay for the expenses incurred
during her detention.
Justice Story considered the case one of "gross and wonton out-
rage."'" "Under such circumstances," he said, "the honour of the
country, and the duty of the court, equally require that a just compen-
sation should be made to the unoffending neutrals, for all the injuries
and losses actually sustained by them.' 149 He further stated: "[I]f this
were a suit against the original wrong-doers, it might be proper to go
yet farther, and visit upon them in the shape of exemplary damages,
the proper punishment which belongs to such lawless misconduct."'510
But, he concluded that the owners, while bound to pay for the actual
loss or injury, were not bound to the extent of vindictive damages.
d Del Col v. Arnold' 51
This case, decided by the Supreme Court in 1796, involved the
capture of an American merchant vessel by a French privateer.
Under the law of prize, jurisdiction in such a case belonged exclusively
to the courts of France. Apparently the point was not raised nor con-
sidered at the time. However, in 1816 the Supreme Court ruled that
147. The Amiable Nancy, 1 F. Cas. at 768.
148. The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 558.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 333 (1796).
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jurisdiction in that type of case belonged exclusively to the courts of
the capturing nation and was prompted to say of Del Col: "To say the
least of that case, it certainly requires an apology." 152
In Del Col, the Court made two formal statements about the law
of prize whose validity was not affected by the 1816 ruling on jurisdic-
tion. The first statement was that "the right of seizing and bringing in
a vessel for further examination, does not authorize, or excuse, any
spoliation, or damage, done to the property;.., the captors proceed at
their peril, and are liable for all the consequent injury and loss. '1 5 3
The second statement was that "the owners of the privateer are re-
sponsible for the conduct of their agents, the officers amd crew, to all
the world;.., the measure of such responsibility is the full value of the
property injured or destroyed."'- 4
e. The Anna Maria 155
The Anna Maria was an American schooner. Because she ap-
peared to be heading toward enemy territory and thus intending to
trade with the enemy, she was chased by the American privateer Non-
such under English colors. The men from the privateer who boarded
her did so in the disguise of British officers and conducted a long and
abusive search which failed to produce any incriminating evidence.
The commander of the privateer did not capture the schooner as
prize. He took her papers instead of entrusting them to a prize-
master, and took out her whole crew and put them and the master in
irons. He then left her in the possession of one of his officers and two
men. They went to St. Jago del Cuba for supplies, and when they
attempted to bring her out of port, she was run aground and injured.
She was sold, with her cargo, and the proceeds were deposited with
the American consul for whoever was entitled to them.
The owners of the Anna Maria and her cargo filed a libel against
the owners of the Nonsuch for reparation of the injury they had sus-
tained. 'The district court dismissed the libel and the circuit court af-
firmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court reversed.
Chief Justice Marshall first examined the facts pertaining to the
voyage of the Anna Maria and found she really was heading for a
neutral port. He then turned to the right of visitation and search. He
152. L'Invincible, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 238, 259 (1816).
153. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 334.
154. Id. at 335.
155. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 327 (1817).
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stated it was "a belligerent right, which cannot be drawn into ques-
tion." "But," he said, "this search ought to have been conducted with
as much regard to the fights and safety of the vessel detained as was
consistent with a thorough examination of her character and voy-
age. '156 He went on to say, "Stripped of her crew and of her papers,
left in the possession of an officer and two men, without orders
whither to proceed, she was exposed to dangers; for the [resulting
loss] ... those who placed her in this situation must be responsible." 157
Justice Marshall concluded: "[T]he justice of the court requires
that compensation should be made for the injury which the libellants
have sustained.1 58 The circuit court was directed to appoint commis-
sioners to ascertain the amount of damages based on the prime value
of the vessel and the prime cost of the cargo.
G. Epilogue
1. The Meaning of "Tort"
I set out to find the meaning of the word "tort" as used by Ells-
worth in the third clause of his draft for Section 9 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789. Ellsworth did not use the word "tort" with the meaning it has
in the common law of torts. He used the word "tort" as a synonym for
the word "wrong." He used it to identify "wrongs" under the law of
prize.
Why did Ellsworth write "tort" rather than the word "wrong"?
As Dean Prosser put it in his classic treatise on the law of torts, "'Tort'
is found in the French language, and was at one time in common use
in English, as a general synonym for 'wrong."'15 9 It gradually ac-
quired a technical meaning in the common law of torts. Not so in the
law of prize. There the word "tort" was seldom used. Indeed it does
not appear in any of the treaty provisions, nor in any of the cases, that
I reviewed in the preceding pages. But it was used occasionally, and
when it was, it was with its old meaning as a word interchangeable
with "wrong." No better proof of this can be advanced than the fol-
lowing passage from the second Note on prize causes written by
Wheaton (Story) in 1817.
[T]he prize court will not only entertain suits for restitution, and
damages in cases of wrongful capture, and award damages therefor,
156. Id. at 332.
157. Id. at 334.
158. Id. at 335.
159. WnLLAm L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs 3 (1941).
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but it will also allow damages for all personal torts, and that upon a
proper case laid before the-court as a mere incident to the posses-
sion of the principal cause. And in such a case it will not confine
itself to the actual wrongdoer; but will... decree damages against
the owners of the offending privateer. And where the captured
crew have been grossly ill treated, the court will award a liberal rec-
ompense.160 (emphasis added).
In 1789, Ellsworth used "tort" with exactly the saae meaning as
Wheaton (Story) did in 1817.
Why did Ellsworth write tort "in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States" instead of being more specific and writ-
ing tort "in violation of the law of prize or a treaty of the United
States dealing with prize"? In the days of Ellsworth, there was no
need to be so specific.
Only the law of nations pertaining to the law of prize ever
granted private causes of actions to the nationals of one country for
the reparation of wrongs in violation of the law of nations committed
by the nationals of another country. When Ellsworth wrote in the
clause that a foreigner could sue in American courts, state or federal,
for a tort in violation of the law of nations, he could mean nothing but
the wrongs committed by American captors in violation of the law of
prize. He could assume that his colleagues in the new Congress would
know what these wrongs were because the law of prize, at least in its
essentials, had deeply penetrated the legal and political culture of the
time.
The same reasoning applies, of course, to the treaties of the
United States dealing with prize. I am not aware of any United States
treaties, other than those dealing with prize, which grant to aliens a
private cause of action for the reparation of wrongs committed by
Americans in violation of the treaties. When Ellsworth wrote in the
clause that a foreigner could sue for a tort in violation of a treaty of
the United States, he could only mean the wrongs committed by
American captors in violation of the prize provisions in the four trea-
ties of Amity and Commerce in effect in 1789. He properly could as-
sume that his colleagues in the new Congress would be familiar with
the prize provisions in the four treaties.
160. Wheaton, supra note 102, at 5.
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2. The Mistake in Filartiga
In Filartiga, the court mistakenly assumed that the word "tort" in
the clause had the meaning it has in the common law of torts. A char-
acteristic of a common law tort is that it gives its victim a transitory
cause of action triable anywhere in the world. Hence the court as-
sumed that in the law of nations and treaties of the United States in
effect in 1789 there were torts giving the victims transitory causes of
action triable anywhere in the world. In my search of the law of na-
tions and treaties of the United States in effect before and after 1789, 1
could not find a scintilla of evidence of the existence of any such torts.
Such torts did not exist.
There is an unfortunate but endemic tendency in legal discourse
to assume that a word which appears in two different legal contexts
has the same meaning in both. Even so, it is surprising that the court
should have made this mistake in Filartiga.
The language of the clause is clear. The tort it contemplates is a
tort under the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. This
language does not create a problem of interpretation. It presents us
with a problem only because of our ignorance today of what was fa-
miliar to those who voted the clause into law in 1789: we cannot un-
derstand what the clause means so long as we do not know what the
word "tort" meant in the law of nations and treaties of the United
States back then. The obvious solution is to do the necessary research
and find out what it meant in 1789. Researching the law of nations in
effect in 1789 might be difficult, not so researching the treaties of the
United States in effect in 1789.
The texts of treaties of the United States in effect in 1789 are in
the second volume of a series available in any law library.161 Fifteen
treaties had been concluded by 1789.162 The first in the book is the
Treaty of Amity and Commerce concluded with France in 1778.16
Within a few pages, anyone looking at the text even cursorily would
come to a stop at Article 17. The Article, as we know, forbids Ameri-
can commanders of men of war and privateers from doing "injury or
damage" to Frenchmen and makes the American commanders liable
to reparation if they do."6 Anyone reading this text would immedi-
161. 2 TPAans Am OnmE INTERNATiONAL ACmS oF Tn UNi'ED STATES OF
AMERCA, supra note 135.
162. See id. at ix.
163. Id. at 3.
164. Id. at 16.
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ately realize that the word "tort" in the clause had nothing to do with
transitory causes of action at common law.
3. The Disregard of Treaties
Why the court in Filartiga, and other courts relying on the tort
clause for their jurisdiction such as the federal Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit in the case of Trajano v. Marcos,165 failed even to
look at the treaties of the United States in order to find out what the
word "tort" meant in 1789, is a question I cannot answer.
IV. THE REASON FOR THE WORD "ONLY"
A. Talbot's Case on Appeal
Earlier in these pages, I summarized the case of Silas Talbot
against the owners of the three American brigs which had taken his
prize, the Betsey. The owners appealed the decision of the Admiralty
Court of Pennsylvania, awarding him the full value of the prize, to the
Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture. The court rejected the appeal.
The owners then removed the case to the High Court of Errors and
Appeals of Pennsylvania. There they argued that the Admiralty
Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case brought by Talbot
because "in cases of damages to be assessed or recovered to make
satisfaction for a wrong or trespass to person or property, the prosecu-
tions ought to be in Courts of Common Law." 166
Talbot raised a different issue before the High Court. The law of
Pennsylvania gave the High Court jurisdiction over appeals from the
Admiralty Court. But Talbot contended that the High Court did not
have jurisdiction to hear the appeal in the case because it was a case of
prize, and all appeals of prize cases belonged exclusively to the Court
of Appeals in Cases of Capture. His argument came at a time when
Pennsylvania was engaged in a bitter controversy with the other states
165. In Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992), the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld jurisdiction over the estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand
Marcos and his daughter Imee Marcos-Manotoc for the torture and death of Archimedes
'rajano. Although the plaintiff and defendants were all Philippine nationals, and the torts
occurred in the Philippines, the court found jurisdiction under the tort clause. Although
the court admitted that "there is no direct evidence of what the First Congress intended to
accomplish," id at 498, the court followed Filartiga and assumed that the Statute was en-
acted "to provide a federal forum for transitory torts." Id. at 503.
166. Talbot v. The Commanders and Owners of Three Briggs, 1 U.S. (1 DalI.) 95, 97
(1784).
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for its refusal to give effect to the decision of the predecessor of the
Court of Appeals in the case of the Active.
B. The Affair of the Active
The conflict over the affair of the Active, which first took place
between Pennsylvania and the confederation, and later between Penn-
sylvania and the federal government, is well known. Hence, it is un-
necessary to explain the affair here in detail. In any case, it would
take too long to do so. I shall make only a short statement of it, in the
hope the statement will be sufficient to make the point it is meant to
make.
The affair began in 1778 when the Active became prize to a vessel
of war of the State of Pennsylvania and other claimants. The contro-
versy in the Admiralty Court of Pennsylvania was between the claim-
ants over their respective share of the prize. The court awarded half
of the prize to the State of Pennsylvania and the commander of the
vessel of war and its crew, and the rest to the other claimants. Four of
the other claimants appealed the award to the Standing Committee of
the Continental Congress. On December 15, 1778, the Committee re-
versed the decision of the Admiralty Court and awarded the whole
prize to those four claimants. 167
The judge of the Admiralty Court refused to abide by the deci-
sion of the Committee. He ordered the marshall to sell the Active and
her cargo and bring the proceeds to his court.16 Benedict Arnold, the
military commander of Philadelphia, warned the Committee of the or-
der issued by the judge of the Admiralty Court.169 The Committee
issued an injunction to the marshall commanding him to hold the
money subject to its order. But the marshall disregarded the injunc-
tion and paid the money over to the admiralty judge 70 who, in con-
formity with his decision, deposited half of the proceeds in the
treasury of the State of Pennsylvania.17'
At that point the Committee announced it would not proceed
further in the affair, nor hear any other appeal, until its authority was
settled. It referred the matter to Congress. The Congress issued, over
the objections of Pennsylvania, a resolution strongly supporting the
Standing Committee, stressing the need to ensure uniform application
167. Ross v. Rittenhouse, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 160, 162 (1792).
168. JAM.SON, supra note 29, at 18.
169. AL at 19.
170. I& at 20.
171. Ross v. Rittenhouse, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 160.
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of the law of nations in all cases of capture, and emphasizing the
supreme power of Congress to do so through a committee of its own
members.172
The resolution had no effect. Thereafter, the Congress twice ap-
pointed a committee to confer over the deadlock with a committee of
the Pennsylvania legislature, but nothing came from i't. 173 Fmally, af-
ter much litigation, in 1809 the Supreme Court of the United States
ruled in United States v. Peters74 that the Standing Committee had
properly exercised its power to reverse the judgment of the Admiralty
Court of Pennsylvania and hence had extinguished any interest the
State of Pennsylvania could claim in the Active and her cargo.
C. The Talbot Decision on Appeal
The High Court of Errors and Appeals of Pennsylvania decided
on January 15, 1785, that it, and not the Court of Appeals in Cases of
Capture, had jurisdiction over the appeal. There are. echoes of the
affair of the Active in its opinion.
Early in the opinion, the Court went out of its way to stress that,
except for the powers conceded to the confederation, Pennsylvania
was still a sovereign state: "This State has all the powers of Independ-
ent Sovereignty by the Declaration of Independence on the 4th of
July, 1776, except what were resigned by the subsequent confedera-
tion dated the 9th of July, 1778, but not completed by final ratification
until the first of March 1781." 175 (emphasis omitted).
The Court then reviewed the provisions in the Articles of Con-
federation which vested in the United States the power to establish
courts for deciding all cases of capture, and the Court also reviewed
the act of Congress establishing the Court of Appeals in Cases of Cap-
ture. It pointed out at length that the jurisdiction conceded to the
Court of Appeals was not simply jurisdiction over cases of capture,
but rather jurisdiction over cases of capture "as prize."
The Court then considered whether the three brigs had captured
the Betsey "as prize" and decided they had not. "In fact," the Court
said, "it was not a real but a pretended capture as prize by them.' 1 76
This left open the issue whether the original taking of the Betsey as
172. Davis, supra note 73, at 32.
173. l at 33-34.
174. 10 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 132 (1809).
175. Talbot, 1 U.S. (1 DalI.) at 99.
176. Id. at 104.
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prize by Talbot made the whole case, including the second taking of
the Betsey by the three brigs, one of capture "as prize."
This led the Court to ask what the courts in England would say in
such a situation, and to refer to Le Caux v. Eden, Lindo v. Rodney,
and even the Silesian Loan Report. However, the Court bluntly de-
clared that even if the English courts would call the case one of cap-
ture "as prize," it would not follow their decision because, it said, now
"we have assumed our station among the powers of the earth."' 77
In concluding that it had the right to exercise jurisdiction over the
appeal because the case was not really one of capture "as prize," the
Court said: "We will endeavour to promote justice, according to the
intentions of the Commonwealth, conveyed in the laws; and not demit
any part of her sovereignty, unless we are convinced beyond a doubt,
that it is our duty to do so."178
Before dealing with the issue whether it, rather than the Court of
Appeals in Cases of Capture, had jurisdiction on appeal, the High
Court had considered, but not resolved, the original question:
whether the Court of Admiralty had jurisdiction in Talbot's case.
However, it had laid down two basic propositions. First, if the case
was not one of prize, the Admiralty Court would still have jurisdiction
over the case as an "instance court."'1 7 9 Second, as an instance court,
the Admiralty Court would not be deprived of jurisdiction because a
common law court could also exercise jurisdiction over the case. 18°
Once the High Court had concluded it had jurisdiction over the
appeal because the case was not really one of capture as prize, it had
no difficulty ruling that the Admiralty Court could not have taken
jurisdiction over Talbot's case as a court of prize. Thus it affirmed the
jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court as an instance court over a pro-
ceeding brought "only" for the reparation in damages of a wrong re-
lated to a capture, but not involving the legality of the capture as
prize.
D. Ellsworth's Draft
Ellsworth was a member of the Committee which reversed the
decision of the Admiralty Court of Pennsylvania in the case of the
Active. He was elected to the Committee twice.181 The draft of the
177. Id- at 106.
178. Id at 107.
179. Id at 98.
180. Id. at 99.
181. Davis, supra note 73, at 24-25.
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act for the Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture is in his handwrit-
ing.182 It is fair to presume that he was well versed in the law of prize
and well understood why the High Court of Pennsylvania would reject
English cases such as Le Caux v. Eden and Lindo v. Rodney. These
two cases had held that the court of prize had exclusive jurisdiction
over anything which was related to a capture jure belli, and by this
standard the appeal in Talbot's case belonged to the Court of Appeals
in Cases of Capture.
He was thus confronted with a political problem. In the second
clause of his draft for Section 9 of the Judiciary Act, he was giving the
federal district courts exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil
causes of admiralty. The occurrence of war would automatically vest
the federal district courts with exclusive jurisdiction over all cases of
capture as prize, without the need for enabling legislation.183 This ex-
clusive jurisdiction would include, under the law of prize inherited
from England, any matter incidental to a capture. Hence the effect of
the second clause would be to deny the courts of Pennsylvania juris-
diction over a suit brought "only" for reparation in. damages of a
wrong related to a capture.
I submit that in view of the political situation, Ellsworth did not
want to contest the jurisdiction asserted by the High Court of Errors
and Appeals of Pennsylvania over suits brought "only" for reparation
in damages of a wrong related to a capture. Therefore, he chose to
maintain intact the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal district courts
over the legality of a capture as prize and over any claim for repara-
tion in damages of a wrong related to the capture in the case. But so
long as the legality of a capture was not in issue, and the suit was
"only" for the reparation in damages of a wrong related to a capture,
he would recognize the jurisdiction of the common law courts of the
several states over such a suit, subject to one proviso: if the suit was
brought by a foreigner, the federal district courts would have concur-
rent jurisdiction with the state courts.
The grant to the federal district courts of the jurisdiction they
were to share with the state courts had to be expressly stated. That is
what Ellsworth did in the third clause of his draft for Section 9 of the
Judiciary Act. It is an elegant piece of draftsmanship, but awfully
cryptic. We must assume it was understandable to persons steeped in
the politics of the time, as the members of the new Congress must
182. 16 JouRNALs OF THE CONTIENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, supra note 23, at 14, 17.
183. The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546, 557-58 (1818).
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have been. But it was a provision manufactured for an odd situation
not likely to recur in the future, and it had such a narrow political
object that it would become more and more difficult to understand as
time went by and political conditions changed. I do not know of any
case in which the clause has been properly applied by a court.
V. POSTSCRIPT: THE PAQUETE HABANA
REDEEMED
In the professional circle to which I belong, everybody is familiar
with The Paquete Habana case.184 I shall proceed quickly to make a
point about its language because of what I have said earlier in these
pages of the law of prize.
The Supreme Court of the United States was sitting in the case as
a court of prize. In so doing, it remained, of course, a court of the
United States, but it was not sitting as such. In the famous words of
Lord Stowell, it was sitting as "a Court of the Law of Nations."I ss He
meant to emphasize by these words that a court of prize never applies
domestic law and applies only the law of nations and treaties, if there
are any. The authorities cited or quoted in the preceding pages amply
support this proposition.
The Court was searching for the rule of prize law applicable to
the capture of fishing vessels. It tried to find out whether the applica-
ble rule of prize law had been declared in a treaty, or an executive or
legislative act, or in a judicial decision. 186 It did not find a treaty, or an
executive or legislative act, or a judicial decision, declaring the rule of
prize law applicable to fishing vessels. In this situation, the only alter-
native was for the Court to search the customs and usages of civilized
nations.
This is a far cry from concluding, as some have, such as the Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals in Garcia-Mir v. Meese,1s 7 that the
Court was asserting it would rely on the customs and usages of civi-
lized nations only if there was no treaty, executive or legislative act, or
judicial decision to the contrary. Such a reading implies that the
United States was free at any time to disregard the customs and us-
ages of civilized nations by treaty, executive or legislative act, or judi-
184. 175 U.S. 677 (1899).
185. The Recovery, 6 C. Rob. 341, 349, 165 Eng. Rep. 955, 958 (Adm. 1807).
186. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1899).
187. 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986).
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cial decision"'8 and is nothing but a nonsensical construction of what
the Supreme Court was actually saying in the case.
188. In Garcia-Mir, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted The Paquete Habana to hold that
an executive decision could override customary international law. Id. at 1453. ThIls led the
court to conclude that a directive by the Attorney General was enough to override custom-
ary international law. Id. at 1454.
A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations
APPENDIX
Section 9 of the First Judiciary Act
And be it further enacted, That the district courts shall have,
exclusively of the courts of the several States, cognizance of all
crimes and offences that shall be cognizable under the authority of
the United States, committed within their respective districts, or
upon the high seas; where no other punishment than whipping, not
exceeding thirty stripes, a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars,
or a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months, is to be in-
fficted; and shall also have exclusive original cognizance of all civil
causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including all seizures
under laws of impost, navigation or trade of the United States,
where the seizures are made, on waters which are navigable from
the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burthen, within their respec-
tive districts as well as upon the high seas; saving to suitors, in all
cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is
competent to give it; and shall also have exclusive original cogni-
zance of all seizures on land, or other waters than as aforesaid,
made, and of all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred, under
the laws of the United States. And shall also have cognizance, con-
current with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as
the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. And
shall also have cognizance, concurrent as last mentioned, of all suits
at common law where the United States sue, and the matter in dis-
pute amounts, exclusive of costs, to the sum or value of one hun-
dred dollars. And shall also have jurisdiction exclusively of the
courts of the several States, of all suits against consuls or vice-con-
suls, except for offences above the description aforesaid. And the
trial of issues in fact, in the district courts, in all causes except civil
causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, shall be by jury.
1995]

